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enfoRcIng access to InfoRmatIon and PRIVacy RIghts: eValuatIng 
PRoPosals foR an InfoRmatIon PRotectIon RegulatoR foR south afRIca
I IntRoductIon
The South African Law Reform Commission has proposed legislation to 
regulate what is variously referred to in international jurisdictions as ‘data 
protection’ and ‘information privacy protection’.1 The Law Commission’s 
own formulation of the basic subject-matter of its proposals is ‘protection of 
personal information’.2 It has accordingly short-titled its proposed legislation, 
the Protection of Personal Information Act. If this name sticks and the legisla-
tion is enacted, it will in all likelihood, given the South African fondness for 
clunky acronyms, become known as the POPIA. Personal information (a term 
of art meaning information, irrespective of the medium in which it appears, 
that reveals something about someone3) is, in the Commission’s proposals, to 
be protected by a complex regime of rights and remedies aimed at regulating 
its collection and dissemination and the uses to which it may be put. Along 
the familiar lines of the European model for data-protection regimes, the 
Commission’s proposed legislation centres on a set of ‘information protec-
tion principles’ which flesh out a general and higher-level requirement that 
personal information must be processed ‘in a reasonable manner in order not 
to infringe the privacy of the data subject’.4
The ‘European model’ referred to above stems from a number of international 
instruments which, though principally intended to regulate the transborder flow 
1 SA Law Reform Commission ‘Privacy and Data Protection’, Discussion Paper 109 (October 200), 
<http://www.doj.gov.za/salrc/dpapers.htm>. The Discussion Paper followed an earlier Issue Paper 
on the same topic (SA Law Reform Commission Privacy and Data Protection (Issue Paper 24 
August 2003). The Commission’s project committee on privacy and data protection is currently 
considering a large volume of comments received on the Discussion Paper prior to finalising its 
recommendations, likely to be published by the end of 2007. These recommendations are made 
to the Minister of Justice who will make the decision whether to introduce the legislation in 
Parliament. On the Law Reform Commission’s processes and working methods, see <http://www.
doj.gov.za/salrc/docs_gen/function.htm>. For a comparative overview of the subject, see A Roos 
‘Data Protection: Explaining the International Backdrop and Evaluating the Current South African 
Position’ (2007) 124 SALJ 400. 
2 See the long title and clause 1 of the draft Protection of Personal Information Bill in Annexure B of 
the Discussion Paper (ibid) (‘draft Bill’ or ‘POPIA’). 
3 See the definition of ‘personal information’ in clause 1 of the draft Bill. The corresponding term in 
the European instruments is ‘personal data’, but the Law Reform Commission has opted to use the 
term ‘personal information’ as it is also employed in the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 
of 2000 (‘PAIA’). 
4 Clause 7 of the draft Bill. ‘Data subject’ means, according to the definitions in clause 1, the person 
to whom personal information relates. While the data subject is the principal right-holder under the 
draft POPIA, the principal duty-bearer is termed the ‘responsible party’, defined as ‘the public or 
private body or any other entity which, alone or in conjunction with others, determines the purpose 
of and means for processing personal information’. The corresponding term in the European instru-
ments (see note  below) is ‘controller’. 
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of personal data, have had a great deal of influence on domestic laws regulating 
data protection. The extent of this influence has resulted in what Lee Bygrave 
terms ‘regulatory convergence’, a family resemblance in the data protection 
laws that have mushroomed around the world since the earliest attempts to deal 
with the threats to privacy posed by computerised storage of personal data in 
the 1970s. In most jurisdictions, data protection follows the same basic recipe. 
According to Bygrave ‘most of the laws take the form of so-called “framework” 
laws: instead of stipulating in casuistic fashion detailed provisions for regulating 
the processing of personal information, they set down rather diffusely formu-
lated general rules for such processing, and make specific allowance for the 
subsequent development of more detailed regulatory norms as the need arises.’6 
The responsibility for developing the detailed norms referred to is usually given 
to an independent regulator, typically called a ‘data protection authority’.7
The Law Reform Commission’s proposals follow this recipe assiduously. 
Application, amplification and enforcement of the information protection 
principles will, in the first instance, be the job of a regulatory authority to be 
called the Information Protection Regulator.8
Our focus in this note is twofold. We consider the adequacy of the proposed 
regulatory authority when measured against the international standards in 
this regard. Secondly, we consider the Law Reform Commission’s further 
recommendation that its proposed Information Protection Regulator should 
also have jurisdiction over the Promotion of Access to Information Act.9 This 
is an interesting proposal which ought to be supported. It restores, as we show, 
aspects of the original design for the Open Democracy Bill, a document which 
has been the basis of much of South Africa’s post-transition transparency leg-
islation. It also has the prospect of curing one of the clearest defects in the 
 The Council of Europe’s 1981 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data (COE Convention) and the OECD’s 1981 Guidelines 
Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Data Flows of Personal Data (OECD 
Guidelines). The OECD Guidelines, structured around a set of Principles for the lawful processing 
of personal information, have been extremely influential in the development of the information 
privacy laws of a number of domestic jurisdictions. This is true also of the SALRC draft legislation. 
Another crucial international development is the European Union’s 199 Data Protection Directive: 
Directive 9/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 199 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data (EU Directive). See L Bygrave Data Protection Law: Approaching its Rationale, Logic 
and Limits (2002) 30-6. 
6 L Bygrave ‘An International Data Protection Stocktake at 2000: Part 1: Regulatory Trends’ (2000) 
6 Privacy Law & Policy Reporter 129, 130. 
7 Ibid. Every jurisdiction with data protection legislation has some form of data protection authority. 
The only notable exceptions are the United States and Japan. 
8 Earlier versions of the Commission’s draft legislation used the nomenclature ‘Information 
Protection Commissioner’ and ‘Information Protection Commission’. See Chapters , 7 and 8 of 
the draft Protection of Personal Information Bill (note 2 above). In more recent drafts, this has been 
substituted with the term ‘Regulator’ in order to clarify the function of the institution: it is intended 
to be a regulatory authority with the principal function of enforcement of the rights and duties in the 
legislation rather than the promotion of the ideal of data protection. 
9 See para 4.2.207 in Chapter 4 of the Discussion Paper (note 1 above). It is intended that, should this 
proposal be approved, the powers and duties of the Commission as currently provided for in the 
draft Bill will be extended and consequential amendments will be made to the PAIA. 
64 (2007) 23 SAJHR
current access to information regime — the absence of an independent, acces-
sible and authoritative mechanism for the resolution of information access 
disputes, other than resort to the courts.
II  enfoRcement of the PRomotIon of access to InfoRmatIon act: a 
bRIef hIstoRy
(a) The Open Democracy Bill
Data protection has been on the South African legislative agenda since 1994. 
In that year, a Task Group on Open Democracy was appointed by Deputy-
President Mbeki.10 The Task Group had the brief of considering the legislative 
changes that would be needed to build what the interim Constitution called an 
‘open and democratic society’11 on the unsuitable foundation of the authoritar-
ian and secretive apartheid state. The Group produced a set of policy proposals 
in January 199,12 recommending that an Open Democracy Act was needed to 
give effect to the constitutional ideal of an open and democratic society and a 
transparent and accountable government. The Group’s draft Open Democracy 
Bill13 was presented to Cabinet in 1996.
The draft Open Democracy Bill proposed by the Task Group had four prin-
cipal parts: (1) freedom of information legislation applicable to information 
held by government bodies (Part III of the draft Open Democracy Bill); (2) 
data privacy legislation providing for the correction of and protection against 
unauthorised use of personal information held by both government and pri-
vate bodies (Part IV);14 (3) open meetings legislation requiring government 
meetings to be open to the public (Part V); (4) legislation for the protection of 
whistleblowers (persons who disclosed evidence of a contravention of the law 
10 The team was able to draw on comparative work by one of its members, Professor Etienne Mureinik, 
on a draft South African Freedom of Information Act, done for the Administrative Law Reform 
Project of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS) in 1993. See J White ‘Open Democracy: 
Has the Window of Opportunity Closed?’ 1998 (14) SAJHR 6, 6-7. On the work of the CALS 
project see further, L Johannessen & J Klaaren & J White ‘A Motivation for Legislation on Access 
to Information’ (199) 112 SALJ 4. 
11 See s 33 and s 3(1) of the Interim Constitution (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 
200 of 1993). 
12 Task Team on Open Democracy ‘Open Democracy Act for South Africa: Policy Proposals’ 
(199). 
13 The draft Bill is available at <http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/bills/199/odb9/toc.htm>. 
14 This Part of the Bill was intended, according to the POLICY PROPOSALS, ‘to protect privacy’ 
(note 12 above, 2). (It should be noted that the Task Group’s work preceded the enactment of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 which, compared to the interim Constitution, 
expanded the scope of the constitutional right of access to information to include private 
bodies.) Part IV was not a particularly good fit with the remainder of the Bill which was princi-
pally concerned with the aim of promoting governmental transparency. The privacy component of 
the Bill aimed at strengthening the rights of the individual in relation to personal information by 
providing an expedited procedure for obtaining access to information about the requester (ie, it was 
made easier to obtain your own information than other information); a right to seek the correction 
of personal information; regulation preventing the improper use of personal information. Unlike 
the access to information and government-in-the-sunshine parts of the Open Democracy Bill, this 
aspect of the legislation applied also to information held by private bodies. 
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or maladministration) from civil or criminal liability, or from employment-
related disciplinary procedures (Part VI).
Substantial modifications were made to this draft by Cabinet1 and by 
Parliament, principally at the committee stage of the Bill by the Ad Hoc 
Joint Committee on the Open Democracy Bill.16 For current purposes, the 
most important of these modifications was the removal of the data-protection 
chapter of the draft Bill. Explaining this change, the Committee reported to 
Parliament its recommendation that the Bill (which had by now been renamed 
the Promotion of Access to Information Bill) should deal only with the issue 
of access to personal information and not with other privacy-related interests 
in relation to such information (such as its control and correction).17 These 
interests, in the Committee’s opinion, were better protected by purpose-spe-
cific privacy and data protection legislation, along the lines of data protection 
statutes in numerous other jurisdictions. The Minister was requested to con-
sider the introduction of such legislation in Parliament. This request was then 
referred by the Minister to the Law Reform Commission and is the origin of 
the Commission’s investigation into privacy and data protection legislation.18
(b) Proposals on the enforcement of the Open Democracy Bill19
An earlier casualty, this time of Cabinet’s changes to the Open Democracy Bill, 
was the Task Group’s proposals on the enforcement of the provisions of the Bill. 
The Task Group had envisaged that proper implementation of the Bill would 
require administrative measures intended to perform two distinct functions:
•  a promotional function: an entity must be established or an existing entity should 
be given the tasks of publicising the rights created by the Open Democracy Bill, 
educating the public and officials about the Bill, assisting members of the public 
to make requests for access to information, conducting research and publishing 
explanatory material about the Bill, monitoring the Bill’s implementation and 
the use that is made of it and reporting to Parliament.
•  an enforcement function: for the rights created by the Open Democracy 
Bill to be enforceable there should be a dispute-resolution process by 
which disputes over access to records can be resolved by an independent 
entity with the power of making authoritative and binding decisions.20
1 After considering the draft Bill for more than a year, Cabinet introduced a modified version of the 
Open Democracy Bill into Parliament as Bill 67 of 1998. 
16 The principal purpose of the Parliamentary amendments was to give more comprehensive effect to 
the right of access to information in private hands (s 32(1)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996) than either the draft Bill or Bill 67 of 1998 had done. See, further, I Currie & J 
Klaaren The Promotion of Access to Information Act Commentary (2002) [1.9]. 
17 See the account of the Committee’s report in paras 1.1.2—1.1. of the Discussion Paper (note 1 above). 
18 Ibid 1.1.4– 1.1.. 
19 Some of the material in this and the following section is drawn from research commissioned by the 
South African Human Rights Commission. See South African History Archive ‘Strengthening the 
Role of the South African Human Rights Commission in Relation to the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act’ in SA Human Rights Commission Report on the Proceedings of the PAIA Indaba 
(January 2004) 131-61. 
20 Policy Proposals (note 12 above) 8-13. 
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Having drawn this distinction, the recommendations of the Task Group in 
relation to enforcement were the following:
•  Information officers: each government body should appoint an official to 
consider requests for access to information held by that body.
•  Internal appeals: if a request for information is refused the requester 
should be entitled to appeal to the head of the public body.
•  Information Court: if the internal appeal is unsuccessful the requester 
would be entitled to appeal to an Information Court. This was envisaged 
as a superior court, established in each division of the High Court and 
staffed by High Court judges but operating under rules designed to ensure 
that they were accessible, cheap, simple, informal and expeditious.21
•  High Court: the decisions of the Information Court would be reviewable in 
the High Court on administrative-law grounds.
The recommendations of the Task Group on the promotion of the rights cre-
ated by the Act were the following:
•  Public Protector: the Public Protector22 would have the responsibility of 
facilitating the exercise of the rights in the Act by, variously: intervening 
on behalf of an information requester; mediating between the requester 
and the government; investigating complaints about maladministration of 
the Act and making recommendations to the government or Parliament; 
representing requesters, or intervening in the public interest before an 
Information Court or the High Court.
•  South African Human Rights Commission: the SAHRC23 could intervene 
in cases when the rights created by the Act overlapped with the constitu-
tional right of access to information. This could entail investigating any 
alleged violation of rights and assisting anyone adversely affected by the 
violation to secure redress.24
•  Open Democracy Commission: a small, independent Commission should be 
established to monitor the effectiveness of the Act and to report annually to 
Parliament. The Commission could propose amendments to the Act based 
conclusions drawn from its monitoring of the implementation of the Act.
(c)  Enforcement provisions of the Promotion of Access to Information Act
The cabinet opted not to accept the Task Group’s recommendations on the 
establishment of Information Courts and an Open Democracy Commission. 
The Open Democracy Bill, in the form in which it was introduced in 
21 Policy Proposals (ibid) 8-9. A specialised information tribunal was considered by the Task Group as 
an alternative to the Information Court but was ultimately rejected by it on the grounds of cost. See 
ibid, 8 note 2. 
22 Established by ss 181-2 of the Constitution and the Public Protector Act 23 of 1994. 
23 Established by s 181 and s 184 of the Constitution and the Human Rights Commission Act 4 of 
1994. 
24 Policy Proposals (note 12 above) 10. 
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Parliament,2 provided instead for disputes over access to information requests 
(after exhaustion of an internal appeal process in the case of public bodies) to 
be litigated in the High Courts. The Bill was then substantially amended during 
the Parliamentary process.26 In the Promotion of Access to Information Act as 
enacted, the dispute-resolution and promotional duties that had been identified 
by the Task Team were re-allocated as indicated in the following table:
Table 1: Allocation of dispute-resolution and promotional duties
Duty Draft Open 
Democracy Bill27
Promotion of Access 
to Information Act 
Promotional duties
Statistical monitoring and annual 
report to Parliament
Open Democracy 
Commission
SAHRC28
Annual review of Act and other laws 
bearing on openness and recommenda-
tions for amendment
Open Democracy 
Commission
SAHRC29
Monitoring of implementation and 
administration of the Act
Open Democracy 
Commission
SAHRC30
Development and conducting of 
educational programmes for the public 
and for officials; promotion of the 
objects of the Act among bodies
Open Democracy 
Commission
SAHRC31
Publication and dissemination of a 
guide on the Act
Open Democracy 
Commission
SAHRC32
Receiving and archiving manuals Open Democracy 
Commission
SAHRC
Assisting requesters to make requests Public Protector SAHRC33
Receiving and investigating complaints 
about maladministration of the Act34 
Public Protector Public Protector3
2 Bill 67 of 1998. 
26 The drafting history of the Bill up to its enactment as the Promotion of Access to Information Act is 
recounted in Currie & Klaaren (note 16 above) [1.7]—[1.9]. 
27 The Bill proposed by the Task Group on Open Democracy and presented to Cabinet in 1996. See 
note 13 above.
28 Section 84 of the PAIA.
29 Ibid s 83(3)(a).
30 Ibid s 83(3)(b).
31 Ibid s 83(2).
32 Ibid ss 10 and 83(1)(a).
33 Ibid s 83(3)(c).
34 Though neither the draft Open Democracy Bill nor the PAIA is particularly clear about this, it seems 
that the intention was for the Public Protector to investigate maladministration in the sense of a 
failure by a body to comply either on a systemic or individual level with the duties imposed by the 
Act. It was not intended that the Public Protector investigate the merits of any substantive dispute 
about the interpretation or application of the Act (eg, the merits of a refusal to grant access on one 
of the grounds listed in the Act). This was the province of the appeal provisions and the Information 
Courts.
3 Section 91(b) of the PAIA.
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Enforcement duties
First-instance internal appeals 
against refusals of requests, against 
fee decisions, against slowness or 
non-responsiveness. 
Internal appeals 
to heads of public 
bodies
Internal appeals to 
heads of type (a) 
public bodies.
No internal appeals 
for type (b) public 
bodies or for private 
bodies. 
Appeals to independent tribunals Appeals to 
Information 
Courts
Administrative-
law review of 
Information Court 
decisions by High 
Court
Appeals to magis-
trates courts36 or High 
Courts.
No review of High 
Court decisions.37 
Appeals against 
magistrates’ court 
decisions. 
Table 1 indicates that in both versions of the legislation:
•  There is a rigid separation of the functions of promotion and enforcement: 
the former is to be performed by the Open Democracy Commission (in 
the ODB) and the SAHRC (in the PAIA); the latter is to be performed 
by Information Courts (in the ODB) or by the High Court (in the PAIA). 
The model adopted by many foreign jurisdictions,38 of having a specialised 
information commission with duties of promotion and powers of dispute-
resolution was not followed.39
•  A further distinction is made in the legislation between dispute-resolution 
in the sense of disputes over the substance of access decisions made in 
terms of the Act and dispute-resolutions about what can be called adminis-
trative failures or maladministration of the Act. The former type of dispute 
is the province of the courts. The latter type of dispute is the province of 
36 In terms of the definition of ‘court’ in s 1 of the PAIA, the courts with jurisdiction to hear appeals 
under the Act are the Constitutional Court, High Courts and magistrates’ courts ‘designated by the 
Minister . . . and presided over by a magistrate . . . designated in terms of s 91A’. All magistrates’ 
courts have been designated as courts in terms of s 1: GN 938 of 27 June 2003.
37 This appears to be the effect of the ouster in para (ii) of the definition of ‘administrative action’ 
in the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000: ‘any decision taken, or failure to take 
a decision, in terms of any provision of the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000’ is not 
administrative action. 
38 See, for example, Ireland. The Irish Freedom of Information Act 1997 creates an Information 
Commissioner with powers to review the decisions of public bodies and to make binding decisions 
on access to records. The Commission also has a number of tasks that could be categorised as pro-
motional: reviewing the operation of the Act, fostering attitudes of openness in government bodies 
and encouraging voluntary disclosure of information and the publication of guidance material on 
the practical operation of the Act. 
39 The reason, it seems, was financial. See the comments by Johnny de Lange MP, erstwhile Chair of 
the Ad Hoc Parliamentary Committee at the PAIA Indaba (Proceedings note 19 above, 12): ‘The 
Committee was in favour of an information commissioner, like in Australia and other countries 
. . . the Minister . . . did not want to commit to it, because clearly there are enormous financial 
implications’. 
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the Public Protector. The Public Protector is therefore given a role similar 
to that performed by the Ombudsman in jurisdictions such as Australia.40
(d)  Evaluating the performance of the enforcement institutions under 
the PAIA
Is the allocation of tasks described above adequate to ensure the effective 
achievement of the goals of the PAIA? The answer is no. Litigation is self-evi-
dently too inaccessible and cumbersome to be an effective means to enforce 
the freedom of information rights in the Act and in the Constitution. This point 
was accepted by the report of the Asmal Committee, an ad hoc Committee 
of Parliament chaired by Professor Kader Asmal MP that was tasked with 
reviewing the performance of the so-called Chapter 9 institutions, ie the vari-
ous ‘State institutions supporting constitutional democracy’ established by 
the Constitution.41 Reviewing the performance of the SAHRC, the Committee 
accepted the Commission’s own view that ‘the cost and complexity . . . [of 
the PAIA’s internal appeals and litigation scheme] often make it difficult if 
not impossible for individuals or groups to exercise their right to informa-
tion through the Act. It is significant that only a handful of cases reach the 
courts’.42 The Committee heard no evidence that the powers of the SAHRC to 
assist requesters been used to ameliorate this problem.43 Moreover, as for the 
SAHRC’s promotional duties in relation to the Act, there was little to suggest 
that the Commission had had much success in this regard. The Committee 
noted a ‘lack of knowledge by public servants and private bodies of the provi-
sions of the Act’, commenting that, given that it was the task of the SAHRC to 
educate the body of information-holders about their duties, that ‘this lack of 
knowledge points to a failure on . . . [the Commission’s] part’.44
The Asmal Committee’s conclusions support widely-held perceptions that 
the enforcement provisions of the PAIA are deficient in two respects:
40 In terms of the Federal Freedom of Information Act 1982, complaints about procedural failures are 
investigated by the Commonwealth Ombudsman. Appeals against refusals of requests are made to 
the Administrative Appeal Tribunal. 
41 Parliament of the Republic of South Africa Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of 
Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions (2007), <http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/chapter_9_report.
pdf> (Asmal Committee Report). 
42 Ibid 174. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. The Asmal Committee’s conclusions correspond to independent research conducted by an 
NGO, the Open Democracy Advice Centre (ODAC), which showed that PAIA requests to both the 
public and private-sector were dealt with extremely slowly or, more troublingly, simply ignored. 
Open Democracy Advice Centre ‘Southern Africa Summary Country Report: Open Society Institute 
Justice Initiative: 2004 Monitoring Study’, <http://www.opendemocracy.org.za/documents/SA200
4OSJIMonitoringStudySummaryRTKday.doc>. There appears to be widespread ignorance of the 
requirements of the Act, even of its existence, in the public sector. An earlier survey conducted by 
ODAC revealed that 4 percent of the public bodies contacted by the Centre were unaware of the 
Act, 16 percent were aware of the Act but did not implement it and only 30 percent were aware of it 
and implementing it. “Few Groups Aware of Act on Access to Information,” Business Day, October 
14, 2002.
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•  For the extensive rights of access to information granted by the PAIA to 
be more than rights on paper, provision must be made for resolution of 
access disputes by some form of independent tribunal. The tribunal must 
be easily accessible and it must be able to decide disputes authoritatively, 
cheaply, quickly and effectively. Because of the expense and inefficien-
cies associated with litigation in the ordinary courts, most jurisdictions 
opt for dispute-resolution by a specialised information Commission or by 
specialised administrative tribunals.
•  For access to information to succeed in its goals of securing an open and 
transparent democracy, it is essential that citizens know of their rights 
under the Act and that officials know about their duties under the Act. This 
requires mechanisms to be put in place for educating the public about the 
Act and training officials in responding to requests. Promotion of the goals 
of the Act also requires mechanisms for assisting members of the public 
to make requests. Provision should be made for compiling statistics on the 
use made of the Act with the aim of identifying and remedying defects in 
the legislation and/or in official compliance with it. Again, most jurisdic-
tions impose these tasks on a specialised information commission.
The Committee’s recommendations to correct these problems centred on the 
creation of an independent ‘dedicated information commissioner’ with power 
to ‘receive appeals from persons lodging requests for information and make 
binding orders on access and disclosure’.4 For reasons of cost, the Committee 
did not support the SAHRC’s own recommendation that an entirely new 
institution be established to perform these functions, but rather recommended 
the appointment of an information commissioner within the SAHRC with a 
‘ring-fenced’ budget and a dedicated staff.46
The Asmal Committee’s recommendations do not consider the Law Reform 
Commission’s proposals for a new information protection authority with 
enforcement authority over both the PAIA and the proposed data protection 
legislation. It is to those proposals that we now turn.
III  the laW RefoRm commIssIon’s PRoPosals
(a)  The EU requirements on data protection enforcement measures
Against the background outlined above, the recommendations of the Law 
Reform Commission for a ‘joined-up’ specialised regulatory authority respon-
sible for data protection and for access to information are extremely promising 
and should be supported. The principal influence on the Commission’s recom-
4 Asmal Committee Report (note 41 above) 174. 
46 Ibid 174—. The Committee made no reference to the Law Reform Commission’s proposals for 
a separate information protection authority. The Committee also made recommendations for the 
merger of several of the current Chapter 9 institutions with a human-rights mandate (specifically 
the SAHRC, the National Youth Commission, the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of 
Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities and the Pan South African Language Board) into 
an ‘umbrella human rights body to be called the South African Commission on Human Rights’ (ibid 
xii). 
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mendations in this regard is the European Union’s data protection regime, a 
regime set out in the 199 Data Protection Directive (EU Directive).47 The 
reason for the Directive’s extraordinary degree of influence on jurisdictions 
outside Europe is trade-related: the result of its requirements governing the 
transfer of personal information to ‘third countries’ (ie, states outside the 
European Union). Article 2 of the Directive provides that ‘the transfer to a 
third country of personal data … may take place only if … the third country 
in question ensures an adequate level of protection’.
As a starting point, ‘adequacy’ can be taken to mean equivalence; in other 
words, personal data can safely be transferred to a third state if it provides 
legal protection that is roughly the equivalent of the EU regime.48 But that is 
not the only criterion: the level of adequacy of protection ‘shall be assessed 
in the light of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer or set of data 
transfer operations; particular consideration shall be given to the nature of 
the data, the purpose and duration of the proposed processing operation or 
operations, the country of origin and country of final destination, the rules of 
law, both general and sectoral, in force in the third country in question and 
the professional rules and security measures which are complied with in that 
country’.49 The European Commission may make binding determinations on 
the adequacy of protection provided by third countries, pursuant to art 2(6) 
of the Directive. The effect of such a decision is that personal data can flow 
from the 2 EU member states and three EEA member countries (Norway, 
Liechtenstein and Iceland) to a third country that is the subject of an adequacy 
decision without the need for any further specific safeguards.0
The EU’s Working Party on Data Protection, set up to advise the 
Commission about the level of protection in the European Union and third 
countries, has taken the view that the concept of ‘adequacy’ requires that 
privacy protection must not only be adequate in terms of the substance of data 
protection rules, but in the means for ensuring effective application of those 
rules.1 According to the Working Party, an effective data protection system 
has three components: 1) compliance with the rules must be ensured by mak-
ing data subjects and controllers aware of their rights and duties and by the 
presence of effective sanctions for breach of the rules; 2) individuals must 
be able to enforce their rights rapidly and effectively and without prohibitive 
cost by approaching an independent institution; 3) individuals must be able to 
47 Note  above. 
48 Bygrave (note  above) 80. 
49 Article 2(2) of the EU Directive (note  above). 
0 In the absence of an adequacy finding, it is necessary to provide specific protection by means of 
a contract between the data transferor and the recipient. In this regard, the European Commission 
has issued standard contractual clauses for data transfers to third countries: see <http://ec.europa.
eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/modelcontracts/index_en.htm>. 
1 European Commission Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data ‘Working Document: Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries: Applying 
Articles 2 and 26 of the EU Data Protection Directive’ (1998) (‘Working Document 12’) .
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obtain appropriate redress for breach of the rules, including compensation, by 
recourse to a system of independent adjudication or arbitration.2
In Europe (and in jurisdictions influenced by the European model) there is 
broad agreement that these components of an effective data protection system 
are best supplied by setting up an independent data protection authority. The 
EU Directive requires member states of the Union to establish or appoint one 
or more independent public authorities which are responsible for monitor-
ing the application of the data protection laws adopted by that state.3 The 
Directive requires data protection authorities to have investigative powers, 
powers of intervention, and power to engage in legal proceedings;4 individu-
als aggrieved by a breach of the rules must be able to approach the authority 
for a resolution; the exercise of the authority’s powers must be subject to 
judicial appeal,6 and authorities must be consulted in developing administra-
tive measures or regulations.7
Additional guidance can be gleaned from the standard wording of 
European Commission adequacy decisions pursuant to art 2 of the Directive. 
Assessments of adequacy state the principle that:
Given the different approaches to data protection in third countries, the adequacy assessment 
should be carried out, and any decision based on Article 2(6) of [the EU Directive] should 
be made and enforced in a way that does not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate against 
or between third countries where like conditions prevail…8.
Accordingly, the protection afforded by third-country jurisdictions, in particu-
lar those who been subject to a decision of adequacy, provide a useful basis of 
comparison for the evaluation of the Law Reform Commission’s proposals.9 
While there are a limited number of decisions concerning the adequacy of 
supervisory authorities and implementation of third parties, some pertinent 
examples will be considered below.
(b) The Information Protection Regulator
Chapter  of the draft POPIA of the Law Reform Commission deals with 
‘Supervision’ and proposes the establishment of an Information Protection 
2 Ibid 7. 
3 Article 28(1) of the EU Directive (note  above). 
4 Ibid art 28(3).
 Ibid art 28(4).
6 Ibid art 28(3).
7 Ibid art 28(2).
8 See, for example, Recital 4 of the European Commission Decision pursuant to Directive 
9/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the pro-
tection provided by the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles and related Frequently Asked 
Questions issued by the US Department of Commerce, 26 July 2000, at <http://ec.europa.
eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/thridcountries/index_en.htm>. 
9 The Commission has so far recognised Switzerland, Canada, Argentina, Guernsey, Isle of Man, the 
US Department of Commerce’s Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, and the transfer of Air Passenger 
Name Record to the United States’ Bureau of Customs and Border Protection as providing adequate 
protection. See ‘Commission decisions on the adequacy of the protection of personal data in third 
countries’ at <http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/thridcountries/index_en.htm>.
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Regulator. The organisation, functions, powers and procedures of the Regulator 
have been drafted with the specific requirements of the EU Directive and 
guiding material in mind. In what follows we briefly (and, given that the pro-
posals have not been finalised, provisionally) examine the proposals against 
the background of the specific requirements set out in the EU Directive, the 
objectives identified by the Working Party and the experience of third-party 
jurisdictions by asking the following questions:
1. Is the Regulator independent?
2. Do the powers of the Regulator foster compliance with rules?
3. Are the Regulator’s procedures accessible, rapid, efficient and cost 
effective?
4. Does the Regulator have strong investigative and intervention powers?
. Are data subjects afforded adequate remedies?
(i) Independence of the Regulator
The EU Directive requires supervisory authorities to act with ‘complete 
independence’,60 a necessary quality for an institution that will regulate the 
processing of person information by both the state and the private sector.61 
The import of the adjective ‘complete’ is that even a small chance of exertion 
of influence by the state, or bias in exercise of power by the authority, would 
lead to an inadequacy finding by the European Commission.62 The require-
ment of independence from the state is, according to Bygrave, measured by 
‘the capacity for a data protection authority to arrive at its own decision in 
a concrete case without being given case-specific instructions…as to what 
line it should take’.63 Bygrave goes on to state that ‘ “complete independence” 
means that great care must be taken in ensuring that the authorities’ inevitable 
administrative dependence on other bodies (eg, through budget and personnel 
allocations) does not undermine the functional independence they are other-
wise supposed to have’.64
The draft POPIA, following the Constitutional convention, states that the 
Regulator ‘is independent and is subject only to the Constitution and to the 
law and must be impartial and perform its functions and exercise its powers 
60 See Recital 62 of the EU Directive (note  above): ‘the establishment in Member States of supervi-
sory authorities, exercising their functions with complete independence, is an essential component 
of the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data’; see, further, art 
28(1). 
61 The draft POPIA applies to the processing of personal information by a ‘responsible party’. The 
latter term is defined as ‘a public or private body or any other entity which, alone or in conjunction 
with others, determines the purpose of and means for processing personal information’ (clause 1 sv 
‘responsible party’). The definitions of ‘public body’ and ‘private body’ are the same as those in the 
PAIA, with the effect that the draft Act is intended to bind the state. On the meaning of ‘public’ and 
‘private body’, see Currie & Klaaren (note 16 above) [4.7]—[4.13]. 
62 Bygrave (note  above) 71.
63 Ibid 70.
64 Ibid 71.
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without fear, favour or prejudice’.6 But such a declaration cannot overcome any 
procedural and structural deficiencies in the legislation’s design that detract 
from independence. In this regard, the Asmal Committee’s review of the 
Chapter 9 institutions has provided useful guidance on important institutional 
aspects of independence. Taking as a starting-point the constitutional standard 
of independence, ie whether from the standpoint of a reasonable and informed 
person there is a perception that an institution is independent,66 the Committee 
concluded that the relevant factors for assessing the independence of a rights-
protecting or regulatory institution are the following: ‘financial independence; 
institutional independence with respect to matters directly related to the exercise 
of its constitutional mandate, especially relating to the institution’s control over 
the administrative decisions that bear directly and immediately on the exercise 
of its constitutional mandate; appointments procedures and security of tenure 
of appointed office bearers’.67 In relation to all of these factors, institutions must 
‘manifestly be seen to be outside government’.68 This means that the National 
Assembly and not the executive is the appropriate body to oversee the appoint-
ment of members, financial matters such as budgets, and it is the Assembly to 
which independent institutions should account.69
The published draft recommendations of the Law Reform Commission70 in 
relation to the factors just mentioned lack detail and are clearly deficient when 
measured against the precise standards outlined. However, these are prelimi-
nary proposals which the Commission clearly intends to flesh out and modify 
in its final report. In doing so, it will undoubtedly be guided by the Asmal 
Committee’s recommendations on institutional, financial and administra-
tive independence, particularly with regard to the necessity of Parliamentary 
rather than executive control and accountability. If so, the result should be a 
data protection authority that meets both the EU standard of independence71 
and that of the Constitution.
6 Clause 3. The formulation follows the establishing clause of the Chapter 9 institutions: s 181(2) of 
the Constitution. 
66 Van Rooyen v S 2002 () SA 246 (CC) paras 32-4. 
67 Asmal Committee Report (note 41 above) 9-10. 
68 Independent Electoral Commission v Langeberg Municipality 2001 (3) SA 92 (CC) para 31. 
69 Asmal Committee Report (note 41 above) 10. 
70 Note 1 above. 
71 For example, in the United Kingdom the Information Commissioner, who is responsible for 
implementing and enforcing the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Freedom of Information Act 
2000 is appointed for a five-year term by the Queen on the recommendation of the Minister of 
Constitutional Development but can, however, only be removed by Parliament. See Schedule  
to the Data Protection Act. Both the Privacy Commissioner and the Information Commissioner in 
Canada are appointed on the recommendation of Parliament for a seven-year term and can only 
be removed by Parliament. See 1980-81-82-83, c 111, Sch II s 3 of the Privacy Act 1980. By 
contrast, Slovakia, which became a member of the EU in 2004, was required by the European 
Commission to make changes to the legislation governing its data protection authority to ensure 
that it would be able to ‘carry out its functions fully independently, not just from executive power 
but also from any other state authorities’, particularly with respect to the allocation and disburse-
ment of its budget and appointment of staff. See Working Party on the Protection of Individuals 
with regard to the Processing of Personal Data Annual Report 2004, 82 <http://ec.europa.
eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/200/8th_annual_report_en.pdf>.
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It is intended that the Regulator’s mandate should include promotional, 
advisory, mediation and enforcement functions. It is worth noting that it will 
be necessary to create mechanisms to ensure that these functions can be car-
ried out independently of each other. To ensure impartiality, employees or 
members of the Regulator responsible for advice, mediation or investigation 
should also not have the power to make binding orders.72
(ii) Fostering compliance with rules
The EU Directive requires data protection authorities to be consulted when 
‘drawing up administrative measures or regulations relating to the protection 
of individuals’ rights and freedoms with regard to the processing of personal 
data’,73 and requires authorities to report publicly on their activities at regu-
lar intervals.74 According to the Working Party, these provisions support the 
objective of fostering compliance with data protection rules by ensuring a 
high degree of awareness of data controllers of their obligations, and among 
data subjects of their rights and means of exercising them.7
The draft POPIA specifically requires that the Regulator is consulted in the 
development of regulations and industry codes of conduct, and more gener-
ally, it is intended that the Regulator will have an educational and promotional 
mandate.76 As to reporting, the model of the Chapter 9 institutions, set out in 
s 181() of the Constitution, is appropriate for the Regulator and should be 
followed: bodies ‘are accountable to the National Assembly and must report 
on their function to the Assembly at least once a year’.77
(iii)  Accessible, rapid, efficient and cost-effective enforcement of rights
As the experience of the PAIA vividly illustrates, legislative rights have limited 
effectiveness unless a supervisory body has the capacity to provide accessi-
ble, rapid, efficient and cost-effective means for individuals to enforce those 
rights. In this regard, the proposals for the proposed Information Protection 
Regulator to have binding dispute-resolution powers and to exercise these 
powers in respect of both the POPIA and the PAIA are crucial. These powers 
are necessary not only to the success of the proposed data protection regime 
but are also an opportunity to cure the single most problematic aspect of the 
access to information regime created by the PAIA.
In essence, the draft POPIA proposes that individual data subjects may 
approach the Regulator for assist in the enforcement of their rights. In the case 
72 In other jurisdictions, for example the United Kingdom, enforcement functions are allocated to a 
tribunal, which operates separately from and independent of the data protection authority itself. 
73 Article 28(2) of the EU Directive (note  above). 
74 Ibid art 28(). 
7 Note 1 above. 
76 Note 1 above, chapter  of the Draft Bill. 
77 The Asmal Committee made several recommendations to improve the exercise by Parliament of its 
accountability and oversight functions over the Chapter 9 institutions. Most notably, it recommends 
the creation of a co-ordinating Unit on Constitutional Institutions and Other Statutory Bodies, 
located in the Speaker’s office. See Asmal Committee Report (note 41 above) 30-31. 
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of the POPIA, these rights stem from the list of ‘Conditions for the Processing 
of Personal Information’ in Chapter 3 or from an industry-specific Code of 
Conduct issued by the Regulator in terms of Chapter 7. In the case of the 
PAIA, the rights stem from the right to request access to a record in s 11 and 
s 0. On receipt of a complaint, the Regulator must investigate (it has powers 
of compulsion of evidence to assist it, see part (iv) below), may attempt to 
settle the dispute or may make a binding decision on the complaint, called an 
‘enforcement notice’. An aggrieved party may appeal an enforcement notice 
to the High Court within thirty days of its issue. The enforcement powers 
of the Regulator do not include the award of financial penalties, but a data 
subject may apply to the High Court for an award of damages resulting from 
an infringement of statutory rights and may request the assistance of the 
Regulator in making such an application.
Currently, the draft POPIA provides little detail on time periods for the 
settlement of disputes. This aspect, which goes to the goals of rapid and effi-
cient enforcement of rights, should not be neglected and the final legislation 
or internal regulations should specify time periods for the processes of inves-
tigation, assessment, and issuing of enforcement notices.78
(iv) Investigative powers
The EU Directive provides specific details regarding what constitutes effec-
tive investigative and intervention powers for data protection authorities, 
powers that are vital for the effective regulation of the statutory rights.79 The 
draft POPIA proposes that the Regulator will have powers to collect evidence 
required to investigate complaints and of search and seizure and, in accord-
ance with the proposal that the Regulator also has powers to enforce the PAIA, 
these should also apply to investigation of access to information matters.
(v) Redress and remedies
As we have seen, the Working Party has identified that a primary objective 
of the enforcement provisions of a data protection regime must be to provide 
appropriate redress through independent adjudication or arbitration, allowing 
compensation to be paid and sanctions imposed where appropriate. The EU 
Directive more specifically requires that data subjects have a right to judicial 
remedy,80 that decisions of an authority giving rise to complaints must be 
78 A pertinent example of the importance of such requirements is found in the case of New Zealand, 
which fell short of providing an adequate level of protection partly due to the inability of its Privacy 
Commissioner to finalise complaints within a reasonable time. It was reported that the ‘EU con-
sultants who conducted an adequacy survey on New Zealand expressed concern that a delay of 
14 months in finalising complaints was highly disturbing’. Phukubje Pierce Masithela Attorneys 
‘Meeting EU standards on data transfer’ 103 Legalbrief Today, 18 January 2006.
79 Article 28(3) of the EU Directive (note  above). 
80 Article 22 of the EU Directive (ibid). 
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appealable through the courts, and that authorities must have the power to 
engage in legal proceedings.81
The binding enforcement notices to be issued by the Regulator will provide 
an important mechanism for redress for data subjects.82 This power is some-
what diluted by the fact that the Regulator, unlike some other jurisdictions,83 
lacks authority to award compensation or impose fines.84 Data subjects are 
required instead to institute court proceedings to obtain compensation, thereby 
detracting from the objective of the Commission to be a rapid, efficient and 
accessible dispute-resolution mechanism. It is intended that the Commission 
will have the power to institute court proceedings to recover damages on its 
own initiative or at the request of data subjects. This will go some way to cur-
ing the problem just mentioned but only if the Regulator has the capacity to 
provide such assistance for every data subject who is seeking compensation.
In relation to appeals, the current draft of the POPIA provides a right of 
appeal to the High Court to the person upon whom an enforcement notice 
has been served, but is silent about data subjects’ right of appeal against the 
content of the notice or a decision not to issue one. The current lack of an 
express right of appeal is a significant inadequacy in compliance with arts 22 
and 28(3) of the EU Directive and should be rectified in the final version of the 
proposed legislation.
IV conclusIon
The experience of the inadequate enforcement of the PAIA shows that a 
statutory rights regime is likely to be ineffective unless adequate, accessible 
and cost-effective mechanisms are provided to right-holders to allow them to 
enforce their rights. The necessity for a proposed statutory regime for the pro-
tection of privacy rights in relation to personal information to comply with the 
EU framework, a framework that places considerable emphasis on effective 
enforcement of data protection rights, is therefore salutary. The demands of 
ensuring that the South African data protection regime provides an ‘adequate 
level of protection’ will ensure that the resultant legislation does not suffer 
from the same design flaws as the PAIA, flaws that, as we have seen, had their 
origins in the enforcement provisions of the Open Democracy Bill. At the same 
time, the Law Reform Commission’s proposals that the principal enforcement 
institution of the POPIA — the Information Protection Regulator — should 
have corresponding powers to enforce compliance with the PAIA, have the 
prospect of curing many of the PAIA’s current defects. Moreover, given the 
considerable degree of overlap between the functions of data protection and 
81 Ibid article 28(3).
82 See the discussion in part (ii) above. 
83 For example, the Privacy Commission of Australia, which has the power to award compensation or 
impose fines. 
84 The EU Directive and interpretative materials do not specifically require that the right to compensa-
tion be enforced by bodies other than courts, and it appears recovery of compensatory damages 
can be provided as either a judicial or administrative remedy. G Greenleaf ‘The European Privacy 
Directive — Completed’ (199) 2 Privacy Law & Policy Reporter 81. 
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access to information, the institutional design of the proposed Regulator — a 
subject-specialised regulatory authority, necessarily equipped with consider-
able technical expertise in fields such as information systems and information 
security — is highly appropriate for supervision of the PAIA.
The Law Reform Commission’s published proposals provide little detail on 
the mechanics of the enforcement of the PAIA by an Information Protection 
Regulator. This is because the proposals were intended principally to canvass 
opinion on the merits in principle of creating a joint regulatory authority to 
supervise data protection and access to information. Though the technical 
difficulties of merging the enforcement provisions of the two statutes should 
not be underestimated, we have attempted to show here that the proposal has 
a great deal of merit, that the result should be the effective protection of the 
constitutional rights to privacy and access to information and that it should 
be supported.
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